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PAKISTANI SELLOUT OF THE MUJAHIDEEN

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TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 113864

GENEVA FOR ROBERT PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, UR

SUBJECT: Q.'S AND A.'S ON GENEVA

1. IS) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE SELECTED HARD QUESTIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NOTE THAT THE QUESTIONS ARE NUMBERED ACCORDING TO A MASTER LIST. WE ARE NOT BURDENING YOU WITH THE COMPLETE COLLECTION. WORDING KEYED TO POST-SIGNATURE

3. WHY DO WE NEED A GENEVA AGREEMENT? WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER NOT TO HAVE ANY GENEVA AGREEMENT AT ALL, BUT SIMPLY TO MAKE THE SOVIETS LEAVE AFGHANISTAN ON THEIR OWN?

A:

-- THE GENEVA ACCORDS CONTAIN A WRITTEN, SIGNED POLITICAL COMMITMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO COMPLETELY WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN IN A FIXED (9 MONTH) PERIOD WITH FIFTY PERCENT OF THEIR TROOPS OUT OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE FIRST NINETY DAYS. THIS SATISFIES A KEY U.S. AND PAKISTANI OBJECTIVE AND PROVIDES THE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN HOME OF AFGHAN REFUGEES WITH SAFETY AND

HONOR AND AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

-- GORBACHEV HAS PUBLICLY STATED THE SOVIETS INTEND TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN IN ANY EVENT, BUT, WITHOUT A GENEVA AGREEMENT, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL COULD BE PROTRACTED AND MIGHT NOT BE COMPLETED -- PROLONGING THE AGONY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THE FIVE MILLION REFUGEES WAITING TO RETURN HOME -- AND COULD EXPOSE PAKISTAN TO ADDITIONAL CROSS BORDER REPRISALS.

-- THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH IS BEING SIGNED BY PAKISTAN AND GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. AND USSR, IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PAKISTAN WHICH REQUESTED THAT THE U.S. GUARANTEE THE AGREEMENT AND HAS URGED THAT IT BE CONCLUDED IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

-- FOR THE PAST EIGHT YEARS, WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER VERY CLOSELY WITH PAKISTAN TO OBTAIN OUR COMMON GOALS OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, RESTORATION OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE SAFE RETURN HOME OF AFGHAN REFUGEES. THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS THE FIRST STEP IN -- AND CRITICAL TO -- THIS PROCESS.

4. DON'T THE GENEVA ACCORDS SIGNAL AN AMERICAN (AND

A:

TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS, ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS SIGNIFIES THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF THE RESISTANCE'S VALUABLE EFFORTS, WITH U.S., PAKISTANI AND USSR INTERMEDIATE SUPPORT, TO END AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN TROOPS, ENCOURAGE THE RETURN OF SOME FIVE MILLION REFUGEES AND ENABLE AFGHANS TO TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO THE PRESSING INTERNAL TASKS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

-- THE INTERESTS OF THE RESISTANCE HAVE BEEN FULLY PROTECTED IN THIS AGREEMENT. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF SIGNING, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE SOVIET UNION THAT, IF THE USSR UNDERTAKES, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. RETAINS THE RIGHT, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, LIKEWISE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

-- WE FULLY INTEND TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT IF MOSCOW CONTINUES TO SUPPLY ARMS TO THE KABUL REGIME.

-- WE HOPE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WHILE SOVIET TROOPS ARE LEAVING. IF NOT, THE MUJAHIDEEN WILL PRESUMABLY KEEP UP THE BATTLE AGAINST THE KABUL REGIME. THE GENEVA ACCORDS DO NOT PROHIBIT THIS; THEY DEAL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

6. IS THE U. S. COMPELLING PAKISTAN TO SIGN AT GENEVA WHEN ISLAMABAD IS NOT REALLY SATISFIED WITH THE ACCORDS?

A:

ABSOLUTELY NOT. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN THE NEGOTIATING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR SUPPORT FOR IT AND HAVE URGED OUR PARTICIPATION AS A GUARANTOR.

7. NOW CAN YOU ARGUE THAT THE GENEVA ACCORDS SOLVE THE AFGHAN PROBLEM WHEN THEY LEAVE A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN POWER IN KABUL?

A:

-- THE GENEVA ACCORDS DO NOT "SOLVE" THE AFGHAN PROBLEM. THEY DO RETURN IT TO THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, WHERE IT RIGHTFULLY BELONGS.

-- ONCE SOVIET FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN, A PRINCIPAL IMPEDIMENT TO AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION WILL HAVE BEEN REMOVED. THIS WITHDRAWAL WILL POSE A STERN TEST FOR THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. UNABLE TO EXTEND ITS EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY MUCH BEYOND KABUL AND A FEW OTHER CITIES WITH THE HELP OF 120,000 SOVIET TROOPS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW IT CAN RETAIN POWER AFTER THE SOVIET MILITARY POWER PROPPING IT UP HAS BEEN REMOVED.

12. WHAT ARE THE PAKISTANI UNDERTAKINGS? DON'T THEY PRECLUDE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE?

A:

PAKISTANI RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE ACCORDS ARE ITS OWN TO INTERPRET. THE U. S. HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD. THE U.S. POSITION IS TO REMAIN NEUTRAL TO THE RESISTANCE SHOULD CONTINUE UNLESS THE SOVIETS AGREE TO STOP ASSISTANCE TO KABUL AS ENDORSED BY PAKISTAN.

13. NOW CAN YOU EXERCISE YOUR RIGHT TO SUPPLY MILITARY

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ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE WITHOUT COMPELLING PAKISTAN TO VIOLATE ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS?

14. HOW CAN THE U. S. SIGN THE GENEVA ACCORDS IF IT INTENDS TO VIOLATE THEM AFTERWARDS?

A:

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF VIOLATING THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

-- AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT, THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GUARANTORS ARE BALANCED AND SYMMETRICAL. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE USSR THAT, IF THE USSR UNDERTAKES, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. RETAINS THE RIGHT, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, LIKEWISE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHO UNDERSTAND OUR VIEW, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO CHALLENGE THIS VIEW OF OUR RIGHTS.

15. THE LEGAL ADVISER OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS REPORTED TO BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO AN INTERPRETATION OF NON-INTERVENTION WHICH ALLOWS THE U. S. AND PAKISTAN TO CONTINUE SENDING ARMS ACROSS THE BORDER. ISN'T THIS A VIOLATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT?

A:

-- ALL U.S. POSITIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY OUR LAWYERS.

17. IF THE U. S. DECIDES TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE MUJAHIDIN FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, WILL PAKISTAN GO ALONG?

A:

-- WE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR WHEN WE SIGNED THE GENEVA ACCORDS. TO REPEAT, THE UNITED STATES RETAINS THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND, SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, WE WILL EXERCISE THAT RIGHT.

-- I AM NOT GOING TO GET INTO ANY FURTHER DETAIL.

18. WON'T PAKISTAN BE PUT IN A BOX IF THE SOVIETS ACCUSE IT OF VIOLATING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT AND INDICATE THAT, AS A RESULT, MOSCOW WILL, NOT BE BOUND EITHER?

A:

-- THIS IS A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO SPECULATE ON IT.

-- IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE SOVIETS SIGNED AT GENEVA IN ORDER TO FIND A POLITICAL COVER FOR WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN TO FIND A PRETEXT TO REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- IN ANY EVENT, THERE ARE MECHANISMS WITHIN THE UN MONITORING STRUCTURE FOR DEALING WITH ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.

19. COULDN'T MOSCOW MOBILIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST PAKISTAN AND BRING PRESSURE ON IT IN THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES IF PAKISTAN CONTINUES PERMITTING ARMS SUPPLIES TO REACH THE RESISTANCE?

A:

-- I WON'T DEAL WITH HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.

-- BUT WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE NOT BARRED FROM CONTINUING TO SUPPLY IF WE WANT TO. NOW WE DO THAT IS OUR BUSINESS. WHETHER OR NOT WE EXERCISE OUR RIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE SOVIETS.

-- WORLD OPINION HAS CONCENTRATED ON THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN SINCE 1979 AND WILL HOLD MOSCOW ACCOUNTABLE FOR ANY FAILURE TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.

23. WHY HAVE THE U. S. AND PAKISTAN ABANDONED THEIR INSISTENCE ON PRIOR FORMATION OF AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT?

Q:

-- WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR VIEW THAT FORMATION OF AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS CENTRAL TO THE PROCESS OF GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE HAVE LONG BELIEVED THAT A KEY TO SERIOUS EFFORTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM TIMETABLE FOR COMPLETE, EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES. NOW WE HAVE THAT.

-- ALL PARTIES TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS HAVE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING WORK ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOLLOWING SIGNING OF THE ACCORDS. CORDOVEZ HAS AGREED WITH THE PARTIES TO WORK ON THIS IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY, NOT AS A UN REPRESENTATIVE. WE HOPE THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

25. DO YOU FORESEE A PLACE FOR THE PDPA IN SUCH AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT?

A:

-- THIS IS UP TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE. HOWEVER, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PDPA LACKS POPULAR SUPPORT AMONG THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

26. HASN'T IT ALWAYS BEEN THE U. S. AND PAKISTANI POSITION THAT YOU WOULDN'T SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PDPA?

A:

-- NO. OUR LONGSTANDING POSITION HAS BEEN THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT WHICH GETS SOVIET TROOPS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AND WILL FACILITATE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND THE EXERCISE OF AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- AS WE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT, BY ACTING AS A GUARANTOR OF THE SETTLEMENT, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO IMPLY IN ANY RESPECT RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN KABUL AS THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

QV1: THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE KABUL REGIME. WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT IT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IMPOSED ON THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BY THE SOVIET ARMY. WE HAVE NOT BROKEN OFF ALL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE KABUL REGIME, HOWEVER, BECAUSE WE FIND IT USEFUL IN OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN A SMALL EMBASSY PRESENCE THERE. WE DO NOT MAINTAIN NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE KABUL REGIME, AND DEAL WITH THEM THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN KABUL ONLY AT A LOW LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT OF ESSENTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSULAR MATTERS.

THE KABUL REGIME HAS IMPOSED A LIMIT OF 20 U.S. PERSONNEL AT OUR EMBASSY. OUR EMBASSY PROVIDES SOME VISA AND OTHER

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CONSULAR SERVICES TO AFGHANS WISHING TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES, AND LOOKS AFTER OUR CHANCERY AND OTHER BUILDINGS OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES IN KABUL. THE AFGHAN REGIME MAINTAINS A SMALL EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.)

27. WHAT ABOUT PRESIDENT ZIA'S FEBRUARY STATEMENT?

A: -- YOU HAD BETTER ASK PRESIDENT ZIA ABOUT THAT. I WOULD NOTE THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE SIGNED THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

31. HAS THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE BEEN CONSULTED ON THIS AGREEMENT?

A: -- PAKISTAN HAS KEPT IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE RESISTANCE AT EVERY STATE IN THE GENEVA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE RESISTANCE.

35. WHY HASN'T THE U. S. GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED THE ALLIANCE AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE?

A: -- CLEARLY, WE VIEW THE RESISTANCE AS POPULARLY BASED AND HENCE ENTITLED TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, IT IS UP TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, NOT THE U.S., TO DECIDE UPON ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS POLITICAL LEADERS.

37. WON'T U. S. AND PAKISTANI SIGNING OF GENEVA ONLY DRIVE THE RESISTANCE INTO IRAN'S ARMS?

A: -- WE SEE NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS ARE VERY DEVOUT MUSLIMS, BUT THERE IS ONLY A SMALL SHIITE MINORITY AND RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN HAVE NOT USUALLY BEEN CLOSE.

39. WHAT IS IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD A GENEVA AGREEMENT?

A: -- IRAN HAS REFUSED FROM THE START TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GENEVA PROCESS, BUT DID AGREE TO BE KEPT INFORMED BY THE UN AND PAKISTAN OF EVENTS IN THE TALKS. IRAN BASES ITS REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE ON THE LACK OF MUJAHIDIN REPRESENTATION.

-- IRAN HAS STATED THAT IT CONSIDERS THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO BE THE SOLE ISSUE.

-- IRAN PROBABLY WILL NOT FORMALLY ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THIS AGREEMENT AND WILL LIKELY CRITICIZE IT. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT HAS THE ABILITY TO DISRUPT SIGNIFICANTLY A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

-- IRAN WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO MAXIMIZE ITS INFLUENCE IN POST-WITHDRAWAL AFGHANISTAN, AND WILL TRY TO CULTIVATE THE RESISTANCE TO THAT END. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MAIN RESISTANCE GROUPS AND IRAN HAVE NEVER BEEN WARM, HOWEVER.

48. ISN'T SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS WITHOUT SETTLEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM REGIME A BETRAYAL OF THE MORE THAN FIVE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES? WILL THEY RETURN HOME SO LONG AS THE POPA IS IN POWER?

A: -- BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ENSURING THE RETURN WITH DIGNITY AND HONOR OF

THE MILLIONS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES FORCED TO FLEE THEIR COUNTRY DUE TO THE SOVIET INVASION. THE COUNTRIES OF THE UN HAVE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED THIS OBJECTIVE AS AN ELEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT.

-- WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, BUT WE BELIEVE CREATION OF AN ORDERLY SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND CREATION OF STABLE CONDITIONS IN THE AREAS FROM WHICH THE REFUGEES FLED.

-- THE GENEVA AGREEMENT HELPS MEET THESE CONDITIONS FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BY SETTING A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR AN ORDERLY RETURN.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL PLAY A KEY-ROLE BOTH FINANCIALLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY IN FACILITATING THIS PROCESS.

41. IF THE REFUGEES ARE FORCED TO RETURN HOME TO AFGHANISTAN AGAINST THEIR WILL, WON'T THEY BE DRAFTED INTO THE POPA'S MILITARY AND BE FORCED TO FIGHT AGAINST THE MUJAHIDIN?

A: -- NO ONE IS TALKING ABOUT FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES.

-- FURTHERMORE, THE PREMISE OF THE QUESTION IS FALSE. IT WOULD NOT ARISE SINCE MOST AFGHAN TERRITORY -- UPWARDS OF EIGHTY PERCENT -- IS ALREADY UNDER RESISTANCE CONTROL. POPA POWER WILL BE FURTHER ERODED AS SOVIET TROOPS WITHDRAW.

47. WHAT ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE GOP?

A: -- THE GOP HAS DONE A MASTERFUL JOB SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN HANDLING THE LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATION ANYWHERE; THE UN AND ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL

AGENCIES WILL HAVE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GOP IN ASSISTING IN THE REPATRIATION PROCESS; WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOP IN ITS EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

51. WILL U. S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN BE REDUCED NOW THAT AN AGREEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN SIGNED?

A: -- WE HAVE HAD A LONGSTANDING AND DURABLE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

-- IT IS IN OUR LONG-RANGE INTEREST, AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE, TO HAVE STRONG, COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN.

-- THE MILITARY COOPERATION THAT WE HAVE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN CONTRIBUTES TO THAT KIND OF STABILITY.

-- THEREFORE, I CAN CONFIDENTLY STATE THAT THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS WILL NOT AFFECT OUR TRADITIONAL COMMITMENT TO AN ONGOING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

53. WILL ALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE BE TERMINATED ONCE THE GENEVA ACCORDS ARE SIGNED? IF NOT?

A:

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